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RES 1PM NON LDQUMR ThE WRITING OF OPINIONS
Harold H. Kolb Jr. 1
The judge is a key member of society. He or she preserves the
communal fabric that makes civilization possible by applying and interpreting the
rules that we have agreed to live by. But judges are not just thinkers and talkers.
They are also writers, for their knowledge of the law and their wisdom in making
decisions are translated into persuasive resolutions, continuing guides for conduct,
by the written word. A successful judge has to be a good writer. A great judge
is almost always a distinguished writer. That is how we recognize his or her
greatness, how we measure it, how we preserve it.
Like all complex human activities, good writing is both a skill and
an art, and cannot be reduced to formulas. There are, however, principles which
apply to most judicial writing that can be summarized in the following six
suggestions:
1. Write for an educated layman. That does not mean, of
course, that the audience for judgments is actually composed of laymen; few
common citizens this side of senility while away an idle hour by perusing the latest
releases from the bench. The audience for judgments is a mixed affair,
composed of the litigants and their attorneys, courts of appeal, working lawyers,
other judges, law professors and students, and occasionally the media. And it
changes from judgment to judgment, depending on the type and the significance
of the case. But whatever the case, the goal should be to communicate to an
educated layman. This goal may not be achieved all of the time, for all
judgments, or even for all sections of a single judgment, but it should be the goal.
There are two reasons to write for the educated layman. The
first is that part of the audience for a specific judgment may well be composed
of ordinary citizens whose lives are touched by the case at hand. It seems only
right, in a democratic society, that a litigant ought to be able to read the order
1 Professor of English, Director of American Studies, and Director of the Center for the Liberal
Arts, University of Virginia. This paper was presented at a seminar for federally appointed
Canadian judges at Mont Ste. Marie on 11 March 1982, and later used in part at the annual
meeting of the NAALJ in Richmond, Virginia on 18 October 1991. The study of jury instructions
cited was by Robert P. and Veda R. Carrow: "Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions," Columbia Law Review, 79 (1979), 1306-1360.
Frank Smith's comments on proofreading are taken trom his understanding Readin (3 ed.,
1982). The quotations from judgments by Mr. Justice Dickson were trom 7on Kenneth Park v.
Her Majesty the Queen, Taylor v. Ankenman and Jaegli Enterprises, and McClelland and Steward
v. Mutual Life, all decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on 22 June 1981. The quotation by
Mr. Justice Hutcheon was taken from Regina v. Morris Davie, Court of Appeal of British Columbia,
decided 10 September 1980. Other examples of less skilled writing come from American and
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that dissolves his marriage, or restores his children, or dismembers his inheritance,
or repairs his house, or sends him to prison. More than that, however, plain
English is not only the best mode of communication for plain people, it is the best
mode of communication even for legal specialists, who process language the
same way everybody else does. How much confusion in law firms, how much
agony in chambers, how much needless litigation has been caused by prolix and
turgid prose created by specialists for specialists. In his Miscellanies-at-Law, Sir
Robert Megarry, Vice-Chancellor of England, cites § 591 of the Municipal Act of
Ontario, Chapter 284:
In all cases where land is sold for arrears of taxes whether such
sale is or is not valid, then so far as regards rights of entry
adverse to a bona fide claim or right, whether valid or invalid,
derived mediately or immediately under such sale, § 10 of The
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act does not apply, to the
end and intent that in such case the right or title of a person
claiming adversely to such sale shall not be conveyed where any
person is in occupation adversely to such right or title, and that
in such cases the Common Law and §§ 2, 4 and 6 of the
statute passed in the 32nd year of the reign of King Henry VIII,
and Chaptered 9, be revived, and the same are and shall
continue to be revived.
When Sir Robert asked an Ontario judge why this section had not been repealed,
the judge replied: "Surely you realize how dangerous it is to repeal anything that
you do not understand."
Some lawyers and judges have fooled themselves into believing
that because they write for specialists, somehow those specialists will be able to
machete their way through a jungle of tangled syntax and overgrown
constructions. Your experience should have persuaded you that lawyers and
judges, hard working and well motivated as they are, can still become bored and
confused by the writing of other lawyers and judges. The common language,
shared by literate members of the community-atlarge, written with clarity and
precision, and simplicity when that is possible, is the most effective means of
communication in all professions.
2. Avoid legal language whenever possible. This point is a
corollary of the first suggestion. Put positively, it means that a judge should use
ordinary English prose when he or she is able to, which should be most of the
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time. Legal writing is not a special language; it is a special instance of normal
language. Admittedly, the law is composed of difficult concepts, abstruse terms,
Latin phrases, and specific wordings that, rolling down the decades and the
centuries, must be repeated verbatim. But these do not constitute the problem;
technical legal phrases should be used when they are needed. "Habeas corpus,"
"burden of proof," and "contributory negligence" are useful and necessary
expressions. But how about "the hereinbefore mentioned plaintiff," or "in futuro,"
or "pray for relief," or said judgment," or "infected with fatal error" or "the counsel
reduced the motion to writing"? (What counsel ever reduced anything when
writing a document?) The problem is that a judge often starts with necessary
legal phrases, and then begins to legalize everything. Once he gets on this
legalistic high horse a judge will write "prior to" for "before," "per annum" for "per
year." All dates become "on or about." All sums become "in the amount of."
Usages that were beginning to sound strange to Shakespeare's contemporaries
are resurrected: "sayeth," "doth," "deemed," 'Witnesseth." Plain "14 April 1981"
balloons into "on or about the fourteenth day of April in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred and eighty-one." Once he is under way, there is no stopping
such a judge until he comes to the end of his ride and triples his decision by
having it "therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed." And even after that he
sometimes canters out over empty space: "If there are any other matters which
cannot be stipulated, the Court will make a determination of same when they are
presented for consideration."
The tendency to grind everything in a mill of legalisms stems
partly from the pleasure of being an insider, of demonstrating one's knowledge
of the subtleties, the manners, the language of the profession. This pleasure is
perhaps excusable in law students, but it ought to be resisted by judges, for it
contributes to the distrust many citizens have of legal procedure and courtroom
action. Partly, though, this tendency is simply one of habit, embedded
everywhere in the linguistically conservative legal profession. A member of a jury
sitting in Ontario is swom to answer 'to the best of [his] understanding," but that
understanding can only be dimmed by the archaisms that swirl around him. He
hears that the constable "shall not suffer any person to speak to the jury." He is
told that he must "hearken to [the] charge" against the accused, who "hath been
arraigned" and "hath pleaded not guilty" and "hath put himself upon his country,
which country you are." The juror next hears that he must be "indifferent
between the Queen and the accused," and that he must "present no person for
envy, hate or malice, [nor] leave any person unpresented for fear, favour,
affection, gain, reward, or hope thereof." After our jury member hath hearkened,
and hath done his best to 'true presentment make," he may be surprised to
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discover that the fine which resulted from his verdict is "made and levied against
[the] goods and chattels, lands and tenements" of the accused. The accused
himself, still puzzling about his chattels and tenements, may wonder if he faces
prison when the derk asks him if he is "content to be bound in the same terms
in which you are now bound." The accused, according to the footnote in the
Ontario manual of Courtroom Procedure, "must answer 'yes,"' just as, according
to another footnote, he must answer yes to a second question that probably
satisfies neither his content nor his understanding: "If you do appear as aforesaid
and do not depart the said court without leave, the said recognizance is void.
Otherwise it stands in full force and virtue. Are you content?" The footnotes
contain some of the best reading in the Ontario manual. Here is the
proclamation which opens a Supreme Court criminal trial:
OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ: ALL PERSONS HAVING ANYTHING
TO DO BEFORE MY LORD THE QUEEN'S JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF ONTARIO AT THIS SITTINGS OF
ASSIZE AND NISI PRIUS, OYER AND TERMINER AND
GENERAL GAOL DELIVERY FOR THE COUNTY (or
DISTRICT) OF .............. DRAW NEAR AND GIVE
YOUR ATTENDANCE AND YOU SHALL BE HEARD. GOD
SAVE THE QUEEN.
NOTE: Because of its long-standing pronunciation in this
manner, "OYEZ' shall be pronounced as "OWE-YAH" despite
any different pronundation shown in authoritative dictionaries.
The last syllable shall be accented. "NISI" shall be pronounced
as "niceeye"; "PRIUS" as "pry-us"; "OYER" as "oi-urr" and 'TERMI-
NER" as 'term-in-urr". The first syllable of each of these words
shall be accented. The word "GAOL" shall, of course be
pronounced 'Jail".
What is most interesting about this fifty-five word proclamation
is the sixty-five word note appended for the enlightenment of a befuddled new
derk, who at this point probably wishes he sold shoes for a living. And, at that,
the footnote stops short of explaining the meaning of these terms that puzzle
clerks, jurymen, and defendants. The prodamation may be splendid ceremony,
but it is doubtful communication. As a sympathetic Auslnder, who has noted
the difficulties inherent in Canada's bilingualism, I wonder why lawyers and judges
insist on compounding the problem by adding Latin and Old English to the
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nation's already heavy linguistic burden. Here is a brief checklist for avoiding
unnecessary legal language:
a. Use technical leal phrases only when you need them. ManyJu understand this point bniliantly when a: is ap.plied to
other professions. They will question a doctor indsivey
stnpping away his jargon to qet at the one or two crucial
medica terms, and then they wll make certain that these terms
are used precsly and consistently. This understanding needs
to be brought home to the law.
b. Avoid qratuitous Latin words and phrases. Some Latin is
essential to the law. we would be handicapped without
caveat emptor, intestate, mandamus, nole prosequi, and tort.One of the advantages of Latin, a dead language, is that these
terms remain stable. A living languaqe, like a orest, has new
shoots sprining up chao'ticall , older growth constantly
adapting to changinq circumstances, and moss-covered relics of
earlier centuries gradually disappeanng from sight. We can begrateful to Latin for is fixed terminology, and also for
contributing a number of phrases-no longer nLeedlinq italics-that
have been adopted into general English usage: ad hoc, bona
fide, ex officio, prima fade, quid pro quo. Together these
immutable foreigners and naturaled citizens perform useful
work in English. But do we really need ab initio, ad litem,
de bene esse, duces tecum, inter alia ipso facto, res gestae,
ultra vires, sub silentio, and viaa voce? And what are we to
make of the Tennessee judge who wrote that "In the case
subj.udice, Thomas Brown et ux had driven to the situs in a
1974 Oldsmobile?".
c Don't reach for a lonq word when a short one will do the lob
better, just because your deosion is important or you nave been
promoted to a higher court or you have received a thesaurus
for Christmas. If the witness simply went home after the fire,
there is no need to rear up and dcedaim that "subsequent to
the conflagration, the witness proceeded to his domicile."
d. Don't toss in weak ciualifinq phrases, whether from temerity
ere is no question"; 'we can say without doubt) or timidit.
'it would appear to be"; "speaking with all deference I would
venture to suggest'), or simply from the pleasure of occupying
the bench. Sme judges lifter their decisions with the witen
equivalents of "ahems"and inside winks and courtly nods. Here
is the conduding page of a decision settingI aside a judgment
of the Exchequer Court, which had overruFed the district courtin a case concerning negligent stowage:
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That Mr. Justice Thurlow considered this assumption
to be of prime importance is evidenced by his saying:
Here, to my mind, the fact that no one has
offered so much as an opinion, let alone
proved facts, as to what it was that was
wrong with the stowage and that caused
the damage, becomes Of pnme importance.
It must, I think, follow from this that the
learned Judges of the Exchequer Court who
sat on this appeal gave no weiqht at all to
the evidence of CapT.in Maley whose profes-
sional opinion, based on an examination of
the damaged cargo in Hold No. 2 the day
after the slip's return, was that 'What it was
that caused the damage" was that the cargo
was "not adequately secured for normal
conditions."
It is true that Captain Maley, having been
engaged by the appellant or its insurers, was
not an entirely disinterested witness, but as I
have indicated, the decision of the learned
trial judge appears to me to have been
based in great measure on his evidence and
with the greatest respect, I do not think it
should be ignored. '
Wrth all respect for the learned Judges sittinq
on appeal in the Excheuer Cour am o'f
the opinion that the evidence in the present
case disdoses that the cargo was defectively
stowed, that there was no other reason for
it having shifted within less than 48 hours
after the ship put to sea, and that such
defective stowage was an act or omission
which reasonably competent stevedores
should have foreseen would be likely to injure
the cargo and which did injure the cargo and
thus caused the damage complained Of.
For all these reasons I would allow this ap-
peal and restore the judgment of the learned&0ia judge.
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Here is the same page, with the cargo lightened:
That Mr. Justice Thurlow considered this assumption
to be of prime importance is evidenced by his saying:
Here, to my mind, the fact that no one has
offered so much as an opinion, let alone
proved facts, as to what it was that was
wrong with the stowage and that caused
the damage, becomes of prime importance.
It must-t-4hin k, follow from th-s that the
.............. f the Exchequer Court whe
....e-ti....e. d ave no weight at-all to
the evidence of Capf.ain Maley wbose profes-
sional opinion, bakd on an exmination of
the damacied cargo in Hold No. 2 the day
after the slhip s return, was that '%,,,at k wta
that ca- -d t e dam@ge' was that the cargo
was "not adequately secured for normal
conditions."
It is true that Captain Maley, having been
engaged by the appellant eoFr6 insuire , was
not an entremy disinterested witness, but as-I
...e .Rditd the decsion of the leared
trial judge appears te -ne to have been
based geatmeasure on his evidence andT gored. , I do not think it
sold be ignored.
case disdoses that the cargo was defectively
stowed, that there was no other reason for
it having shifted within less than 48 hours
after the ship put to sea, and that such
defective stowaqe was an aEt or omizion
which reasonably competent stevedores
should have foreseen A-:uld bz likly to injure
vh rdid injure the cargo a1
FOr all *ece rasons I would allow this ap-
peal and restore the judgment of the leaf
trial judge.
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e. Avoid piling nouns on top of other nouns. Nominalization, as
the linguists call it, slows a reader down. Since it is built into
legal and business terminology-County Taxation Board, Real
Property Appraisal Manual-the legal writer needs to be
espedally careful not to add to the problem with cumbersome
combinations of his own invention: County Taxation Board
equalization table, fact situation, nominal improvement
assessment, influence factor, issue-oriented aspect, leadership-
type decision, minimum average gross horticultural product
sales requirement.
f. Avoid expressions, often assodated with legal documents, that
have no real legal function. These expressions simply call
attention to themselves, like medical students at my university,
who wear their white coats-stethoscopes sticking prominently
out of pockets-in bookstores, restaurants, and barbershops.
Legal writing is weakened, not strengthened, by 'Vvhereas," "as
to whether," "said verdict," '"wtnesseth," "hereinabove," 'further
affiant sayeth naught," "be and the same is hereby," "learned
trial judge," "thereof," 'to wit." And the writer who daims that
these are terms of art, with fixed and understood meanings,
needs to spend an afternoon with his law books and his
dictionary. There he will learn-if he consults Webster's Second-
that whereas means "considering that; it being the case that
... implying a recognition of facts followed by inferences of
something consequent"; and he will find that whereas also
means "on the contrary ... implying opposition or contrast to
what precedes."
A spedal kind of functionless legalism derives from what seems
to be the extraordinary fertility of the language of the law, its
genius for reproduction. As soon as "null" appears, 'Void"
follows, and then, tumbling out of the warren, come "cruel and
inhuman," "allege and contend," "have and recover," "fitting and
proper," "duly and suffidently," "stipulated and agreed upon."
Right behind these twins are triplets: "dear, cogent, and
convindng," "arbitrary, unreasonable, and capridous," "bias,
prejudice, and partiality," "rest, residue, and remainder." And
from there it is a short step to a massive population explosion.
While I am travelling, my wife has a document that empowers
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her to "make, endorse, accept, receive, sign, seal, execute,
acknowledge, and deliver deeds, assignments, agreements,
certificates, hypothecations, checks, notes, bonds, vouchers,
receipts, and other instruments in writing of whatever kind and
nature as may be necessary, convenient, or proper." Mark
Twain took a swing at this sort of language in Life on the
Missisppi, where he described a prohibition bill that was
pending in Burlington, Iowa:
A bill to forbid the manufacture, exportation,
importation, purchase, sale, borrowing, lending,
stealing, drinking, smelling, or possession, by conquest,
inheritance, intent, accident or otherwise, in the state
of Iowa, of each and every deleterious beverage
known to the human race, except water.
g. Avoid expressions that concern the process of decision making:
"After listening to the lengthy testimony of the witnesses, I then
researched the appropriate authorities."
"No citation of authority is needed."
"I have carefully considered all of the evidence."
"From an examination of all of the facts and circumstances in
this case we must condude .... "
"After a careful review of the entire record, induding the lay
witnesses and the medical testimony, and relying upon the
previous decisions of our appellate courts, the Court finds that
The reader should be given the fruit of judicial decision making,
not a tour through the garden in which the fruit ripened.
3. Write condsely. Length, of course, cannot be dictated
arbitrarily. The length of any discourse is a matter of appropriateness, but readers
of the law consistently agree that although a few judgments are too short, most
are too long. This tendency stems from good intentions, for judges are careful
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and consdentious people. They wish to do their task thoroughly, to give fair
consideration to both parties, to cover all contingendes, to allay-perhaps smother-
possible objections to the decision, to prove that they were awake on the bench,
or, if not, that they at least read the transcript afterward. These are worthy goals.
But, as Virgil tells us in his native language, not ours, fadlius descensus Averno
("easy is the descent to hell"). If these good intentions result in prose that is
bloated, difficult, incomprehensible, prose that forces a reader to skip to the last
page in order to find out what in fact was held, then no good cause has been
served.
There are several ways to control the length of an opinion. The
first is to organize-a subject I will touch on again-so that the materials are
presented once, in an orderly fashion, and do not wander all over the map. Too
many legal opinions, like the lower Mississippi River, require two thousand miles
of meandering to cover one thousand miles of distance. These extended judicial
travels are not merely an inconvenience to a reader and a waste of his time.
They may well disrupt his intellect. Studies of the psycholinguistics of language
indicate that some redundancy assists but excessive redundancy impedes
understanding, that a reader may carry a greater amount of information away
from ten pages than he does from twenty. In both written and oral discourse,
less is often more. A recent study of jury instructions came to the startling
conclusion that when a judge states and then restates a proposition to explain it
to a jury, he may well confuse rather than clarify the issue, and send the jurors
into their deliberations thinking that the statement and restatement are two
different, even conflicting, propositions. This study daims that the problems jurors
have understanding their instructions-apparently jurors comprehend about forty
per cent of what they are told-stem from language rather than law. Jurors were
derailed more by redundancies and nominalizations and misplaced modifiers than
they were by legal terms: 'these [grammatical constructions and discourse
structures] rather than the legal complexity of the jury instructions, were
responsible for comprehension problems."
Often opinions can be easily trimmed by redudng the amount
of quotation. Judges have a tendency to quote entire paragraphs of law or
precedent, and then-because a reader doesn't know in which direction to swim-
the judge will toss her or him a lifeline by italidzing the sentences that are crudal
to the development of the point. The solution is simply to quote the crucial
sentences and omit the rest. Since a reference is always given, the reader who
happens to be interested in the entire statute cited, or the whole case, can look
it up for himself.
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A well-written, concise opinion is a selected summary of a
proceeding, not a complete record. There is no need for a judge to compete
with the court reporter. The judge's task is to convert the materials of the
proceeding to the purpose at hand, decision making, rather than to review all of
the documents, the statements of witnesses, the disputations of counsel. The
essential arguments must be discussed; noressential arguments may be
summarized; trivial arguments may be abruptly dismissed. Counsel often hunt in
court with shotguns; a judge should go armed with a rifle.
4. Divide your opinion into sections. This uncontroversial
suggestion should corroborate your experience in reading well-crafted judicial
prose. Organization into sections makes it unnecessary for the writer to repeat
issues or facts, and makes it possible for the reader to know, at any particular
moment, where he or she is, why certain information is being given, how it
relates to what came before and to what follows. Normally, there are five parts
to an opinion:
a. Summay. This brief statement, usually a paragraph is enough,
sets out the type of case, the parties involved, and-if an appeal-
how the case reached the appellate court.
b. Issues. Once the reader knows what the case is about in
general terms, he or she needs to know what issues must be
decided. If there are several, they should be given separate
treatment or grouped by categories, perhaps with an
introduction that puts the various issues into a general
perspective-a view of the woods before individual trees are
identified.
c Facts. With the issues established, the writer now has a guide
to selecting the appropriate facts out of the welter of testimony
and exhibits and documents. He or she should present only
those facts that are pertinent to the determination of the issues
or are necessary for a general understanding of the situation.
Often the factual material is best presented in a brief
chronological narrative, since that form is anticipated and thus
quickly understood by the reader.
d. Decision. Having identified the issues raised by the action and
having described the relevant facts, the writer is now in a
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position to answer the questions that the issues pose. Here the
judgment is made and the reasons for judgment, with the
appropriate authority, are given. If the issues are organized in
numerical sequence, the same sequence might well be
followed in the deision.
e. Conclusion. A judgment should end with a brief statement of
the deision; or, if there are many parts, a brief summary of the
several decisions.
This five-part organization may not be suitable all of the time,
for every writer must be alert to create a structure appropriate to his or her
content; form follows function in judicial opinions as well as architecture. In a
short decision, these sections may be combined. The facts, if they are simple,
might be covered in the opening summary. In a lengthy judgment more
subdivision may be needed. If the issues can best be understood after the facts
are presented, then sections b and c should be reversed. Nevertheless, this
organization, or a version of it, will usually get you through. Here is a recent
judgment by the Honorable Mr. Justice Brian Dickson, of the Supreme Court of
Canada, in which the flesh has been removed from his fourteen-page decision so
that only the organizational skeleton remains:
The appellant, John Kenneth Park, was charged with unlawfully
breaking and entering a dwelling in Toronto and stealing
jewelry and a sum of money. He pleaded not guilty and was
tried in the County Court Judges Criminal Court of the Judidal
District of York, by a judge without a jury. Convicted, he was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. An appeal to the Court
of Appeals for Ontario was dismissed without written reasons
and the matter has now reached this Court, by leave.
At issue is the admissibility of a statement made by Mr. Park,
without which the conviction cannot stand.... Proof of the
voluntary nature of the statement is generally, though not
invariably, made on a voir dire, a trial within a trial. In this case,
however, counsel for Mr. Park purported to waive the holding
of a voir dire. The issue is whether in law an accused, or
counsel on his behalf, may waive the holding of a voir dire and,
if so, whether there was, in the drcumstances of this case, a
proper waiver.
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The Facts
The dwelling house at which the break, entry and theft
occurred was located at 57 York Downs Drive. Dr. Morris
Herman resided next door. At about 7:15 p.m. on the evening
in question, in early December, Dr. Herman ...........
In his notice of appeal to this Court, the appellant raises the
following issues:
1. Did the trial judge err in failing to conduct a
voir dire to determine whether the statement
was voluntary and admissible regardless of
the fact that the appellant's counsel
purported to waive the voir dire?
2. Did the trial judge err in failing to conduct a
voir dire to determine whether the statement
allegedly made by the appellant was in fact
made?
3. Did the trial judge err in failing to conduct a
voir dire, notwithstanding the purported
waiver, after the appellant testified that his
conversation with the police was preceded by
both a threat and an inducement?
II
The Right to Waive a Voir Dire
Generally speaking, the only way that a trial judge, trying an
accused with a jury, can determine whether any statement
given by the accused is voluntary is by holding a voir dire in the
absence of the jury ...............................
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges
III
Was the Statement in Fact Made
The second ground of appeal was framed in terms of error on
the part of the trial judge in failing to conduct a voir dire to
determine whether or not a statement allegedly made by
Mr. Park was in fact made ...................
IV
Inducement or Threat
I come now to the final point of appeal, pressed rather faintly,
as it seemed to me, by counsel for the appellant. It is said that
the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire when,
notwithstanding the waiver of voir dire by counsel, the
appellant later testified that his conversation with the police
officers had been preceded by both a threat and an
inducement. He said that at the outset of his conversation
w ith . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I would dismiss the appeal.
Here we have the five sections, with a slight variation that sets
up a tripartite division of the issues:
a. An opening summary, which identifies the
appellant, briefly describes the case, and sets
out its history in the lower courts
b. The main issue to be deided-the admissibility
of a statement by the appellant, given the
waiver of a voir dire by his counsel
c. The facts, with a conduding section that
divides the main issue into three specific
questions concerning
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1. the waiver
2. the existence of the
statement
3. the conduct of the police
officers
d. The decision, divided into three parts, each
with a Roman numeral and a subtitle, each
responding to a specific issue defined in c:
part II decides issue 1
part III deddes issue 2
part IV decides issue 3
e. The condusion, pared down to only five
words, which has the simple grace of the
columns we use to build our halls of justice.
5. Begin with your condusion. This advice, initially, may seem
idiosyncratic, and it appears to violate the organization recommended above in
part 4. It caused something of an uproar at the first Canadian Judicial Writing
Program, if uproar is not too strong a word for a gentlemanly debate which took
place inside the mellow elegance of Osgoode Hall. Many judges argued that a
decision must preserve objectivity, that it must give a hearing to both sides.
Stating the condusion at the beginning, they maintained, appears to prejudge,
to present a determination before the evidence has been considered. Others,
using a different tack, daimed that opening with a condusion spoils the suspense
and thus lessens the reader's interest. All of these points are important, though
I would reply to the last that the novels of Agatha Christie are not an appropriate
model for a judicial decision-a '/ho won it," I suppose, rather than a '"who done
it." There is enough mystery in the law as it is.
Let me rephrase the suggestion: begin either vith your
condusion or by pointing toward it. A judge doesn't have to nakedly blurt out
the conclusion in the first paragraph. But-and this is the key point-whether the
condusion is stated at the beginning or not, the opinion ought to be headed for
its destination from the very first word. The opening summary, the statement of
issues, the selection of facts, the choice of authorities, what is induded and what
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is left out, should all be governed by the condusion; and if they are, the opinion
will move forward with the apparent inevitability that is the signature of a
distinguished legal writer. The reason that lawyers turn to the last page first is
not that they are interested only in the bottom line, but that reading the last
page first tells them, in effect, how to read all the other pages. A reader needs
to know what the destination is in order to understand the route of travel.
Looking back at the five-part organization, we can see that the ends point toward
one another. The opening summary and the condusion do similar jobs-one
looking forward, the other looking back. This circularity illustrates the essential
point that all communication is simultaneously inductive and deductive:
generalization must precede as well as follow specific details.
Thus, the condusion to a judgment must be present in the
beginning, either explicitly or implicitly. Putting an explicit condusion at the end
of the opening paragraph, though certainly not mandatory, is a technique that
a judge ought to consider using on occasion. Here is an example of how firm
and persuasive this technique can be-the first paragraph of a decision of the
Court of Appeals of British Columbia written by Justice H.E. Hutcheon:
The question on this appeal is whether Lander, C.C.J., was right
when, after a voir dire, he ruled inadmissible a statement made
by the accused. The ground of the ruling was that the
statement made by the accused was a "private communication"
which had been intercepted without lawful authorization.
Section 178.16 renders inadmissible any such statement. I
think that the ruling was wrong.
We have been discussing, in essence, the end of beginnings-last
sentences of first paragraphs. Let us look for a moment at the beginning of
beginnings. Law, like mathematics, is full of general concepts and abstract
precepts. Yet behind most proceedings beat the hearts of human beings,
enmeshed in the daily realities that make the whole world kin. A brief summary
of the human situation-what happened to whom-placed at the beginning of a
judgment often assists a reader in understanding the legal technicalities that
follow. It may be that the striking openings of Lord Denning-"lt was bluebell time
in Kenf'; "Old Peter Beswick was a coal merchant'-are not appropriate for less
gifted and less confident writers, but all judges would do well to consider
beginning with a short explanation of the human drama that underlies most legal
action. I tum again to Mr. Justice Dickson, and two of his characteristic opening
paragraphs:
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On April 8, 1976, Teresa Taylor and a friend were taking a ski
lesson from Paul Ankenman on the slopes of Gibson Pass, in
Manning Park, British Columbia when Larry LaCasse came over
the crest of a knoll and accidentally collided with her, causing
her grievous injuries. Through her parents she sued LaCasse for
skiing out of control, Ankenman for negligence in conducting
the ski lesson, Jaegli Enterprises as Ankenman's employer, and
other defendants as occupiers and operators of the ski hill for
negligence in permitting a danger or trap to exist where Teresa
was injured.
Terence Robertson committed suicide in New York City on
January 30, 1970. He was an author who had been
commissioned by the publishers McClelland and Stewart Limited
to prepare and write a biography. One of the terms of the
agreement between Mr. Robertson and the publishers provided
that Mr. Robertson would obtain a policy on his life in the
amount of $100,000.
In each case we have immediately the essential fact on which
everything else hangs-Taylor's injury and Robertson's suicide. Both are presented
succinctly, yet graphically. In the Taylor case, the clause "came over the crest of
a knoll" contains in a flash the speed and surprise of the accidental collision. In
the Robertson case, the short first sentence-'Terence Robertson committed suicide
in New York City on January 30, 1970"-evokes by its very brevity the shock of
suicide and the fragility of human life.
6. Follow the prindples of good composition. Good judicial
writing is, in essence, simply good writing, and the judicial writer is bound by the
same rules, conventions, possibilities, limitations, and agonies that govern all
written communication. We have already seen several principles of good
composition: considering the audience, avoiding jargon, writing concisely,
organizing into sections, keeping the condusion in sight from the beginning. Let
me suggest several more:
a. Write for others, not for yourself. A legal
opinion is not a diary entry, but an act of
communication. Many problems in writing
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are not problems for the writers; they know
what they mean, and therefore can leap
nimbly over the ellipses, jagged constructions,
and mixed modifiers that trip readers, who
are further from the case, who are not privy
to material not stated, who may not
understand a writer's assumptions, who are,
finally, outside the writer's head. To be
successful, a writer must fill in gaps that a
reader cannot span, just as he or she should
leave out statements that a reader will find
obvious. The writer must consider how the
message will be received in order to
determine how it should be sent.
b. Keep to the main point, resisting the
temptation-the siren call that drives legal
prose upon the rocks-of adding every
qualification, every nuance, every aspect of
every point in each section. In both the
opinion as a whole and in the individual
sentence, there is, as Justice Cardozo warns,
the danger of "an accuracy that defeats
itself.... The sentence may be so
overloaded with all its possible qualifications
that it will tumble down of its own weight."
The legal writer who tries to play it safe by
induding everything often communicates less
than the writer with the skill and the courage
to select only the right things, the necessary
things.
c. Put your prose into chunks that the reader
can digest. These chunks need to have
internal coherence-subjects dose to verbs,
modifiers dose to what they modify-and they
need to be of manageable size. Since the
average English sentence contains about
seventeen words, sentences that consistently
expand to fifty or one hundred words will
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slow down any reader, layman or lawyer,
espedally if those long sentences do not have
dear points of demarcation inside.
Paragraphs, too, need to offer resting
stations for the eye and for the mind. The
paragraph that never ends makes a reader
wish he had never begun.
d. Emphasize nouns and verbs the strong
words in English, rather than relying on
adjectives and adverbs. If a witness didn't
know the acts, say so, rather than "his actual
knowledge of the case was extremely limited
as far as the real facts were concemed."
e. Don't overwork the verb to be. This verb
has spawned the most common and most
important word family in English/s, are, was,
were-but that distinction should not
encourage you to use it continuously. The to
be habit not only tires a reader, it gives less
information in a sentence than other words
might and less vigor and color as well, a
point we can see by returning to the slopes
of Gibson Pass:
On April 8, 1976, Teresa
Taylor and a friend were
taking a ski lesson from
Paul Ankenman on the
slopes of Gibson Pass, in
Manning Park, British
Columbia when Larry
LaCasse came over the
crest of a knoll and
acddentally collided with
her, causing her grievous
injuries.
A less skillful writer might have put it this way:
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This is an action which
resulted from an incident
on April 8, 1976, when
Teresa Taylor and a friend
were at Gibson Pass, in
Manning Park, British




who is a defendant in this
action, was involved in an
accident with Ms. Taylor,
and many injuries were
suffered.
f. Use the active voice, most of the time. The
passive voice takes longer to read than the
active, and it often gives ambiguous or
incomplete information. Thus, in most
instances a writer should attempt to get the
doer of the action in front of the verb, where
we expect him or her to be. Rather than
"many injuries were suffered," leaving us
wondering just who was hurt, write that
'Teresa Taylor suffered many injuries" or that
"Larry LaCasse caused many injuries to
Ms. Taylor." Rather than "it is alleged," or "it
was decided," state who did the alleging,
who did the deciding. Save the passive voice
for occasional variety, and for the few times
when it is more precise than the active voice.
'Three bullets were fired" is an excellent
sentence if you don't know who pulled the
trigger. If you do, say so: "Patrolman
Deegan fired three bullets."
g. Be specific, whenever possible. The legal
writer faces all the normal difficulties that
other writers face, and additional ones as
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well. His or her material is often general,
preceptual, abstract; yet a reader needs
specific details, individual applications,
concrete images to assist his understanding
and keep his interest. Therefore, a legal
writer should work for specificity whenever it
is possible. In the citation of facts, one
should normally refer to the litigants by their
names, rather than by their legal
designations: "Marlow crashed into Allen's
car"' rather than "the defendant-appellant
crashed into the third-party tort-feasor's
vehicle." Often precise details are more
accurate, more informative, than general
statements. Rather than saying that "Marlow
made an improper response to the situation,"
say that he '"ailed to stop at the intersection."
Rather than "Marlow's testimony was not
impressive in the light of other testimony,"
give the reason: "Marlow's daim that his
vision was impaired by grass six feet high
was not consistent with photographs of the
scene introduced into evidence." Here, as
always, the reader must be kept in mind.
The judge who wrote "in the light of other
testimony" was undoubtedly thinking about
the photographs, but if they have not been
mentioned the reader has no way of
knowing just what hard substructure
underlies the spongy surface of
generalization.
h. Use accepted conventions of grammar and
typocraph . Our school teachers tend to
make a fetish of correctness, forgetting that
language is a set of conventions and that
usage is relative. German writers are
perfectly content with what we call the
comma splice. French does not capitalize the
first-person pronoun. Spanish begins an
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interrogative sentence with a question mark.
Americans put the final period inside
quotation marks, Canadians put it outside.
The school teachers are right, but for the
wrong reason. Conventions of grammar and
usage must be followed, not because they
are linguistic absolutes or moral imperatives,
but simply so that the reader will not be
distracted from the writer's meaning.
Teach your secretary, your spouse, your derk-
whoever gets the last crack at your opinions-
how to proofread, for the nation's law ought
to be meticulously accurate in every aspect,
large and small. The lesson, an easy one, is
best explained by psycholinguist Frank Smith,
of the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education: 'The brain identifies letters,
words, [and] meaning, but not at the same
time; that is, the brain can perform these
three distinct tasks on the same visual
information, but it can do only one task at a
time." Good readers make bad proofreaders
because they have learned to read rapidly for
meaning by looking only at parts of letters,
halves of words-as little visual information as
possible. To proofread one must slow down,
and look at everything.
7. Write and then rewrite. The more we learn about
composing, the more we discover that writing is largely revision, a fact that skilled
authors have known all along. Justice Brandeis puts it this way: "There is no such
thing as good writing. There is only good rewriting." Composing a good
judgment is not a single, definitive act, but a process. The writer begins with
notes, written or dictated, and perhaps with some form of outline. Then he or
she usually proceeds in the following four stages:
Rough Draft Write a first draft-a rapid
statement of main ideas-without worrying
about order, redundancy, or final polish. In
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the early stages writing is a process of
exploration, and you should be open to all
the possibilities in the material that occur to
you.
Revision Let the first draft rest a day if
possible, so you can chew over the ideas,
often subconsciously, and so you can come
back to your draft as a critical stranger.
Now write a second draft-often a major
reworking, and usually a major pruning, since
at this stage the focus shifts from discovery
and indusion to shaping and selection.
Examine the large units of structure, checking
for logical connection of main ideas and the
best order of paragraphs and blocks of
paragraphs.
Then write a third draft, concentrating on
smaller points of style. Tune sentences for
best phrasing and rhythm. Check for
effective beginnings and condusions to
sections and paragraphs.
Editing Check facts, names, dates,
quotations, citations, footnotes. Check
correctness, grammar, punctuation, spelling.
Proofreading Read rapidly for meaning.
Then read again slowly, letter by letter, for
typographical errors.
The idea of a genuine rough draft, written rapidly and without
concern for wording or polish, may help judges who are frustrated in their
attempts to produce finished judgments in a single act. Many legal writers, I
would guess, write one-draft documents that are repaired rather than revised-a
tendency too often encouraged by secretaries who wonder why you can't get
it right the first time. Considering writing as a series of rewritings takes the
pressure off and allows for the continual reshaping of schemata that, according
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to cognitive psychologists, lies at the center of the process of thinking. The
revisions required by the second draft allow the writer to develop the potential of
ideas that may be embedded inchoately in the rough draft. The second draft
also provides an opportunity for what may be the most difficult of all the acts in
the process of writing-throwing things away. If the writer is on track, the third
draft allows him to shift his attention to particulars of style, to effective
presentation of the ideas that have been blocked out and then refined in the
rough and second drafts. The final steps of editing and proofreading assign to
their proper place those details that should not be allowed to interfere earlier in
the composing process.
This model, of course, is a general one, and like most models
it both clarifies and oversimplifies its subject. Many writers proceed more or less
in this fashion, though some skipping around is usual. Occasionally the writer will
burst forth with a bit of finalkiraft rhetoric in the early stages. And some
alterations in the late stages may require new sections of rough draft. For any
given writer, on any given project, some stages may tend to merge, others may
need to be extended.
At this point, two questions might be raised: 'What about
dictating?" and "Do I really need so many drafts?" My experience with dictating,
and with reading dictated opinions, especially those dictated from the bench,
persuades me that dictation can play a role in writing, most appropriately in the
early stages, but an opinion that is merely dictated will rarely be a first-class act of
communication. And, yes, a good written opinion will normally require at least
three drafts. Fewer might be satisfactory in order to make a record for your
personal use, but only through the process of revision can you shape your ideas
effectively for readers who do not have your knowledge, your experience, your
research, your observation of the witnesses, your hearing of the arguments. And
many legal writers, often our best ones, don't stop at three drafts. Those
sentences by Mr. Justice Dickson that we admired earlier did not simply spring,
like Athena, fully armed from the forehead of Zeus. Their author stated last year
that he writes "eight or nine drafts" of judgments.
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Writing is hard work. The novelist Thomas Berger puts it this
way:
At the beginning of my career I prepared myself for each
session of writing by whimpering all afternoon, watching
television all evening, and, after throwing up at midnight,
fastening myself to the desk with shaddes, to remain there till
dawn.
No one ever promised you that being a judge would be an easy task. The
rewards in your profession come not from primrose paths of dalliance, but from
the satisfaction of knowing that a difficult and important job has been well done.
I urge you to remember that writing is at the center of your job, and that a
judgment is not well done until it is well written.
